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1 INTRODUCTION1
Dutch contract law relies heavily on the open standard of reasonableness and
fairness. In the end, the interpretation of a contract is based on “reasonableness
and fairness”, hereinafter also referred to as “good faith and fair dealing”. The
same goes for the question whether an addition to the contract is required,
because the parties have forgotten to include a provision.2 Moreover, the
exercise of contractual rights is not only correctedwhen there is abuse of rights,
but also if reliance on those rights were unacceptable in the circumstances
according to standards of reasonableness and fairness.3 Finally, a number of
provisions are regarded as special elaborations of the principle that parties
should behave in accordance with the requirements of reasonableness and
fairness. A typical example is the provision about unforeseen circumstances.4
According to this provision the court may, upon the demand of a party, modify
or set aside the contract on the basis of unforeseen circumstances that are of
such a nature that the other party may not, according to standards of reason-
ableness and fairness, expect the contract to bemaintained in unmodified form.
This express acknowledgement of the role of reasonableness and fairness
is not unique. There aremore legal systems inwhich similar notions have roles
to play. Thus, anyone who familiarises themselves with the Unidroit Principles
for International Commercial Contracts (PICC) or the comparative comments
on the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), can see that such notions
are recognisable everywhere, for example in words to the effect that contract
parties must observe “good faith and fair dealing”.5 Although the differences
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1 This contribution is based on two earlier publications. See M.H. Wissink, ‘Vertrouwen op
tekstuele uitleg’, in: Th.M. de Boer, J.W. Fokkens, P. Vlas, M.J. Vos & C.L. de Vries Lentsch-
Kostense, Strikwerda’s Conclusies (Essays in honour of Luc Strikwerda),Deventer: Kluwer 2011,
pp. 585-601 and ‘Afspraak is afspraak?”, Tijdschrift voor Agrarisch Recht 2005, pp. 210-219.
2 Article 6:248 paragraph 1 DCC (Dutch Civil Code).
3 Article 6:248 paragraph 2 DCC.
4 Article 6:258 DCC.
5 C. Von Bar and E. Clive (eds.), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private
Law, DCFR, Full Edition, München: Sellier 2009, p. 679 et seq.
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between legal systems often concern the formal position of such notions (e.g.
do they only pertain to the performance of the contract?), in the end they are
concerned with their importance. Do such notions play a prominent role,
indeed one which sometimes permeates contract law as a whole, as is the case
in Germany and the Netherlands? Or is this a marginal role, whereby express
recognition is granted merely in certain cases, as in English law?6
The above may give the impression that reasonableness and fairness will
in Dutch contract law usually play a dominant role when solutions for concrete
cases are sought. Nevertheless, theorymay differ frompractice in this respect.
In theory, reasonableness and fairness always come into play. And it stands
to reason that nobody (wherever this may be) will defend the position that
the court must attain a result which is obviously unreasonable. That is the
long and the short of it for most cases, though. What really matters, is to
determine the true meaning of reasonableness and fairness in concrete cases
where the issue is the interpretation of or addition to a contract or interference
in the exercise of contractual rights. For example, the court cannot simply
interpret the contract in a way which it deems reasonable and fair. It must
interpret the contract on the basis of rules of law that are geared to the inten-
tion of the parties or to themeaning that third parties attribute to the text used
by the parties. Reasonable expectations will be instrumental here, such as the
question how certain words will normally be understood. Still, the importance
attached to this may be greater, but it may also be less.
Indeed, when a court has to assess a contract there is always an area of
tension between “certainty” and “flexibility”. This may be translated roughly
into the question whether the court should interpret the contract primarily
literally, should sparingly add terms, and should only in highly exceptional
circumstances – i.e. practically speaking: should not – interfere in the exercise
of contractual powers. Naturally these questions also turn up in a system such
as Dutch contract law.While Dutch law encompasses the possibility of “flexi-
bility”, it is not compulsory. The system provides an equal opportunity to give
priority to “certainty”. The courtmay postulate a flexible approach to awritten
contract, for example when it has been drafted by parties lacking expertise,
in great haste and with the intention to represent no more than the outlines
of their agreement in words understandable for them at that moment. The
court may postulate the (relative) certainty of the text, for instancewhen there
have been final negotiations about the contract by professional parties assisted
by expert legal advisers who have made sure that the text of the contract
adequately and fully represents the consensus of the parties.
6 On the question how English law should deal with the duty to act in good faith accepted
elsewhere, see for example Gerard McMeel, The Construction of Contracts. Interpretation,
Implication and Rectification, Oxford University Press 2011, pp. 104 and 297 et seq.; Neil
Andrews, Contract Law, Cambridge University Press, pp. 375, 659 et seq.
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In the former case a flexible approach represents what in that particular
case is in keeping with reasonableness and fairness, since that approach takes
into account the circumstances of the case and the interests of the parties. In
that sense it is sufficient for the parties to make an inadequate representation
of their agreements in the contract, for they will not be punishedwith a textual
interpretation that does not do justice to their intentions. Of course they will
pay the price for this, i.e. they will have to incur costs ex post in order by
means of proceedings to obtain clarity on the contents of their contract and
in so doing will run the risk of the court ruling against them. In the latter case
a strict approach, aiming at legal certainty, will represent what in that case
is in agreementwith reasonableness and fairness, because that approach takes
the circumstances of the case and the interests of the parties into account. They
have invested ex ante in a contract representing their consensus as adequately
and fully as possible and may therefore assume that the text of the contract
will take priority in its interpretation.
These examples indicate that giving a central role to reasonableness and
fairness in contract law admittedly opens up the possibility of a flexible
approach to a contract, but does not compel anyone to do so, and that the
circumstances may also justify a stricter approach. While this broad range of
optionsmay be agreeable for a court, enabling it thereby to attune its resolution
of a conflict to the particularities of a case, it may simultaneously lead to a
measure of uncertainty for the parties about the way in which the court will
view their contract, if they are forced to seek a court judgment in case of a
conflict. It is against this background that this contribution concentrates on
the question to what extent the parties can exert influence on the way in which
the court will approach their contract. Thereby the interpretation of the contract
will be first and foremost. In this respect Dutch law shows a distinct develop-
ment, emphasising the importance of “certainty” in specific cases. Following
on that, some attention will be devoted also to the influence of the parties on
the addition to the contract and on the possibility of rectifying the exercise
of contractual powers.
2 CERTAINTY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT
The discussion whether Dutch law in its interpretation of certain contracts
succeeds in striking the right balance between legal certainty and flexibility
has been going on for awhile. Some authors are of the opinion that themanner
inwhich contracts are interpreted according to Dutch law leads to uncertainty
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which specific types of parties would wish to avoid.7 A remedy could be
found in an approach to the contract that would be textual in principle. There-
by the interpretation of the contract would be influenced less by ‘the circum-
stances of the concrete case, assessed according to standards of reasonableness
and fairness’.8 The result would be that it is clearer beforehand how the
contract should and will be interpreted. It appears that this criticism is voiced
(in any case: also) against the background of the international commercial legal
practice.9 Just think of professional parties in an international context, under
the influence of the Anglo-American legal sphere, concluding commercial
contracts about the text of which they have had final negotiations assisted by
specialised legal advisers, whether based on internationally current models
or not. If these parties need the contract to be interpreted textually, there is
reason to consider to what extent Dutch law can fulfil that need.
In order to preventmisunderstandings it is useful to describewhat ismeant
by the phrase ‘textual interpretation’ in this contribution.While thismay differ
from case to case, an attempt will be made to give a general interpretation
of this for the benefit of the discussion. Textual interpretation obviouslymeans
7 See for this opinion, with different nuances, inter alia F.W. Grosheide, ‘Lees maar, er staat
wat er staat’, Contracteren 2000/4, p. 100 et seq.; the same, ‘Ad fontes’, Contracteren 2005/2,
p. 30; R.P.J.L. Tjittes, ‘Enige opmerkingen over de beperkte rol van de redelijkheid en
billijkheid in het ondernemingsrecht’, Contracteren 2001/2, p. 31; the same, Uitleg van
schriftelijke contracten, Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri 2009, p. 24; C. Drion, ‘Evenwicht en
proportionaliteit in het (commerciële) contractenrecht’, in: J.J. Brinkhof et al. (ed.), Contrac-
teren internationaal (Grosheide-bundel), Den Haag: Bju 2006, p. 190; R.H.J. van Bijnen,
Aanvullend contractenrecht (doctoral thesis Tilburg), Den Haag: Bju 2005, p. 319; R. de Vrey,
‘Het waterdicht maken van een Nederlands contract op Angelsaksische wijze’, in Contrac-
teren internationaal 2006, p. 87 et seq.; R. Hofstede and W. Oostwouder, ‘To cultivate com-
mand of language. Over het gebruik en de uitleg van Engelse termen in Nederlandse
(overname-)contracten’, in Contracteren internationaal 2006, p. 30; H.N. Schelhaas, ‘Pacta
sunt servanda bij commerciële contracten’,NTBR 2008/4, p. 150 et seq.; J. Meier Timmerman
Thijssen, ‘De ontvankelijkheid van het Nederlandse privaatrecht voor invloeden vanuit
de Anglo-Amerikaanse financieringspraktijk’, Contracteren 2009/4, p. 123. Further compare
M. Wolters, ‘Uitleg van schriftelijke overeenkomsten. Over de onzalige trend naar een
primair taalkundige uitleg van contracten’, Contracteren 2009/1, p. 14; M.M. van Rossum,
De redelijkheid en billijkheid bij commerciële contracten (oration OU), Deventer: Kluwer 2010;
C.E. Drion, ‘Anglo-Amerikaanse contracten, een zegen of een ramp?’,NJB 2011/24, p. 1523;
P.S. Bakker, ‘Uitleg van commerciële contracten (I)’, WPNR (2011) 6891, p. 477.
8 Dutch Supreme Court 20 February 2004, LJNAO1427,NJ 2005/493 with commentary from
C.E. du Perron (Pensioenfonds DSM-Chemie/Fox).
9 Thus, there are many references to English law. See on interpretation Lord Hoffmann in
Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v. West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896, 912.
See for example R.P.J.L. Tjittes,Uitleg van schriftelijke contracten, Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri
2009, p. 77. This has brought English law closer to Dutch law among others, but howmuch
closer is a matter of appreciation. See for instance Lord Hoffmann in Chartbrook Limited
v Persimmon Homes Limited and others [2009] UKHL 38 esp. nos. 37-39 and 47; J.M. van
Dunné, ‘Normatieve uitleg à l’anglaise. Investors Compensation Scheme (1998) als de
Engelse Haviltex-zaak’, in: E.H. Hondius et al. (ed.), Contracteren internationaal (Grosheide-
bundel), Den Haag: Bju 2006, p. 104.
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an interpretation based on the text as a whole, i.e. including arguments that
may be derived from its methodology. That will not suffice, though, as it is
inevitable to consider factors outside the text in order to attach significance
to it. Factors such as the type of transaction and its business background do
tend to cast light on themeaning of the text. In addition, the context may prove
that the contract does not use certain terms in their customary linguistic
meaning, but in a technical meaning connected with the nature of the trans-
action. Although the above may be extended with more examples,10 the aim
here is to clarify that textual interpretation encompasses more than a merely
linguistic interpretation of the contract and cannot go without the context.
Consequently, textual interpretation is not at oddswith a contextual interpreta-
tion, it is more a matter of gradation. Textual interpretation presupposes a
certain attitude to the text of the contract. To put it briefly, the point is that
in determining what the parties have agreed, the third party called in to do
so (court, arbitrator) should focus attention on the text. The text is central and
contextual factors, if any, play a role in that light. First the text, then the rest,
if necessary. In this way, one avoids elaborations unknown beforehand (i.e.
at the time of conclusion of the contract) of what requirements of reasonable-
ness and fairness would entail in the circumstances of the case, unless this
is impossible.
What does Dutch law now have to offer to the professional parties referred
to in 7? According to the casebook judgment Pensioenfonds DSM-Chemie/Fox,
in the interpretation of a written contract all circumstances of the concrete case
are always decisive, assessed according to what the standards of reasonableness
and fairness entail.11 At first glance this is a far cry from the textual interpreta-
tion described above. On closer consideration, though, that is not always so.
After all, in practice interpretation does not take place on the basis of this
principle, but on the basis of a criterion of interpretation grafted onto it.12
Briefly put, interpretation is generally conducted on the basis of either the
‘Haviltex’ criterion, named after the 1981 judgment in the case Ermes/Havil-
tex).13 Upon application of the (subjective-objective) Haviltex criterion the
question at issue is what the parties thought and could think they agreed to;
in that context all circumstances of the case are relevant. However, in some
case, notablywhen interpreting collective bargaining agreements, an (objective)
criterion is applied. According to this so called CAO criterion (these three letters
refer to the Dutch abbreviation for collective bargaining agreement) the ques-
tion is what third parties think the document means; in that context not only
10 Think of interpretive tools such as those expressed in articles 4.4-4.7 of the Unidroit PICC.
11 Dutch Supreme Court 20 February 2004, LJNAO1427,NJ 2005/493 with commentary from
C.E. du Perron (Pensioenfonds DSM Chemie/Fox).
12 Dutch Supreme Court 1 October 2004, LJN AR2974, NJ 2005/499 (Taxicentrale Middelburg),
refers only to the principle, for that matter.
13 Dutch Supreme Court 13March 1981,NJ 1981/635 with a commentary form C.J.H. Brunner.
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textual arguments are relevant, but other arguments also, provided they are
objectively apparent.14 The casebook judgment referred to holds that there
is a smooth transition between the two criteria of interpretation. On the one
hand, because there is sometimes a reason for a more objective interpretation
in the application of the Haviltex criterion in connection with the position of
third parties. On the other hand, because the collective bargaining agreement
criterion takes into account more circumstances than just textual ones. The
contracts discussed in this contributionmust in principle be interpreted accord-
ing to the Haviltex criterion, which, as stated, already leaves room for an
objective application. In all cases the text of the contract is, of course, an
important factor. In the Pensioenfonds DSM-Chemie/Fox judgment it is also
observed that the idea underlying both the collective bargaining agreement
criterion and the Haviltex criterion is that the interpretation of a written
contract should not be made only on the basis of the linguistic meaning of
the words in which it has been put. However, as the Dutch Supreme Court
continues, in practice the linguistic meaning usually attributed to these words,
when read in the context of that document as a whole, according to generally
accepted standards (in the relevant circle of society), are often of great rel-
evance in the interpretation of that document. This observation is made against
the background that (even) according to the Haviltex criterion the text of the
contract is not sanctifying. As the Haviltex criterion is context-sensitive, it is
equally possible in its application in a concrete case that much or little weight
should be accorded to the text of the contract. This is right and proper accord-
ing to Dutch (and other)15 views, because the parties are bound to what they
envisaged. If the text expresses the parties’ intention inaccurately or incom-
pletely, then this will be taken into account. For the Dutch Supreme Court
it appears to be relevant to retain an equilibrium between factors providing
“certainty” and factors providing “flexibility” in the interpretation of contracts.
A judgment balancing between different approaches may well be unavoidable,
not only because Dutch law is familiar with both approaches (and variants),
but also because the Dutch Supreme Court here speaks at a high aggregation
14 See for example Dutch Supreme Court 20 February 2004, LJN AO1427, NJ 2005/493 with
commentary from C.E. du Perron (Pensioenfonds DSM Chemie/Fox); Dutch Supreme Court
8 October 2010, LJN BM9621, NJ 2010/456.
15 See C-W Canaris and H.C. Grigoleit, ‘Interpretation of Contracts’, in: A. Hartkamp et al.
(ed.), Towards a European Civil Code, Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri and Kluwer Law Inter-
national, 2011, pp. 606-607; article II:801(1) DCFR and the pertinent Notes 8 and 9 (C. Von
Bar and E. Clive (eds.), Principles, Definitions andModel Rules of European Private Law, DCFR,
Full Edition, München: Sellier 2009, p. 558. This approach is taken in article 56 of the
Feasibility study for a future instrument in European Contract Law dd. 3 May 2011 of the
Commission Expert Group on EuropeanContract Law (http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/
consumer/docs/explanatory_note_results_feasibility_study_05_2011_en.pdf) and in article
58 of Annex I to the Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law
(COM(2011) 635 final) of 11 October 2011.
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level, namely about the interpretation of all contracts in all possible sorts of
cases, which may thus be vastly different from each other.
At the same time reference may be made to a tendency in the case law
of the Dutch Supreme Court in the interpretation based on the Haviltex cri-
terion to attribute much weight to textual arguments when the dispute con-
cerns commercial contracts concluded between professional parties for which
the final negotiations have been conducted with the assistance of legal
experts.16 Thereby, then, it aims for the objective application variant of the
Haviltex criterion. In a number of cases, (too) briefly put, a (more) textual
interpretation of the relevant contracts is approved by the Dutch Supreme
Court. That textual arguments in these cases carry a lot of weight, does not
appear to be the result of a merely case-bound judgment of the weight of the
arguments put forward by the parties for or against a certain interpretation.
It turns out that there is a normative component at play as well: textual argu-
mentsmust weigh heavily here. This tendency forms part of a broader develop-
ment in Dutch law, whereby different cases arementioned inwhich an object-
ive interpretation occupies a special place.17 At the same time the standard
application of the Haviltex criterion is maintained, which also gives the court
more scope to tackle the interpretation of the contract in the manner it deems
best in the given case,18 even if this should mean that the contract is not
interpreted literally. Thereby the court deciding questions of fact has a great
16 Dutch Supreme Court 19 January 2007, LJNAZ3178,NJ 2007/575 (Meyer Europe/PontMeyer);
Dutch SupremeCourt 29 June 2007, LJN BA4909,NJ 2007/576with commentary fromM.H.
Wissink (Derksen/Homburg); Dutch Supreme Court 9 April 2010, LJN BK1610, NJ 2010/411
(UPC/Aandeelhouders Signal); Dutch Supreme Court 4 June 2010, LJN BL9546,NJ 2010/ 312
(Euroland/Gilde Buy-Out Fund).
17 Dutch Supreme Court 20 February 2004, LJNAO1427,NJ 2005/493 with commentary from
C.E. du Perron (Pensioenfonds DSMChemie/Fox)mentions the collective bargaining agreement
criterion and considers that there may be reasons for a more objective interpretation under
Haviltex in connectionwith the interests of third parties. See further: Dutch SupremeCourt
8 December 2000, LJN AA8901, NJ 2001/350 (Eelder Woningbouw/Van Kammen), Dutch
Supreme Court 13 June 2003, LJNAH9168,NJ 2004/251 (Teijsen/Marcus) and Dutch Supreme
Court 22 October 2010, LJN BM8933, NJ 2011/111 with commentary from F.M.J. Verstijlen
(Kamsteeg/Lisser), all about the interpretation of a notarial deed of transfer of or creation
of a right to a registered property regarding the question what has been transferred or
created; Dutch Supreme Court 23 December 2005, LJN AU2414, NJ 2010/62 (De Rooij/Van
Olphen) about the interpretation of a provision about ‘normal use’ in a standard deed such
as the NVM deed; Dutch Supreme Court 2 February 2007, LJNAZ4410,NJ 2008/104 (NBA
Management/Meerhuysen) about the interpretation of a perpetual clause in auction conditions.
Sometimes it is sufficient to indicate that there is a reason for interpreting a contract
especially on the basis of objective factors; see Dutch Supreme Court 16 May 2008, LJN
BC2793, NJ 2008/284 (Chubb/Dagenstead) concerning the description of cover in a contract
of insurance; Dutch SupremeCourt 22October 2010, LJNBN5665,NJ 2010/570 (Euronext/ASF
Brokers) concerning the AEX Listing and Trading Rules; Dutch Supreme Court 18 June 2010,
LJN BL8514,NJ 2010/354 (Erasmus Beleggingen) concerning a perpetual clause and a stipu-
lation attached to a certain capacity.
18 Dutch Supreme Court 23 April 2010, LJN BL5262, RvdW 2010/579 (Halliburton/X).
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arsenal of strategies at its disposal for the interpretation of a contract. Although
it is clear in some cases that a certain mode of interpretation must be selected,
the choice of the approach to be adopted is mostly left to the understanding
of the court (of the fact-finding instance).
In view of this case law there is a good chance that according to Dutch
law, textual arguments will play a big role, or will even be decisive, in the
interpretation of commercial contracts concluded between professional parties
for which the final negotiations have been conducted with the assistance of
legal advisers. However, it is not a foregone conclusion that the court must
in such contracts always select this mode of application of theHaviltex criterion.
Perhaps that would be asking too much, notably for a practical reason. Even
though this group of contracts may be described in the abstract on the basis
of a number of factors (such as professional parties, commercial contract,
negotiations assisted by advisers), that description is not so accurate that one
can always say that textual arguments should carry a lot of weight in the
interpretation. It does make a difference how professional the parties involved
really are: is it a small shopkeeper, working locally, or an internationally
operating company? It alsomakes a difference how intensive the negotiations
have been and to what extent the pertinent expert assistance influenced the
phrasing of the contract. Prescribing a certain manner of interpretation
exclusively on the basis of the factorsmentioned could give rise to discussions
about the proper delineation of the relevant category, when the discussion
should focus on the proper interpretation of the contract. Conversely, an
inductive approach, like the one adopted so far by the courts , allows the court
to assess on the basis of the concrete case whether the case is one in which
a (more) textual interpretation of the contract is called for.
Does this case law sufficiently meet the need of certain parties for their
contract to be interpreted textually? For the parties that would like to have
clarity beforehand about the questionwhether their contract will be interpreted
textually, the message has not been unambiguously confirmed according to
the current state of the art in case law. The existence of the possibility or even
likelihood of a textual interpretation of the contractmay not be enough tomeet
the need for textual interpretation when that question implies that the parties
(and their advisers) may firmly depend on it. Can this certainty be provided
under Dutch law?
Although courts, on the basis of their extensive experience in deciding all
kinds of matters about different types of contracts, may have reasons to ques-
tion the correctness of a textual interpretation, there may be grounds in certain
cases to focus on that in particular. Not in every case does the contract prove
to be the reliable compasswhich the parties had beforehand thought they could
go by safely. Experience has shown that a textual interpretation only gives
certainty to the extent that the text closes discussions. Whether the text will
indeed prove to do so, is something that the parties can never be sure of in
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advance.19 Nor are they sure in advance whether their own party interest
will in a future dispute be served best by a textual interpretation. Still, it is
conceivable that the parties are aware of this and yet display a preference for
textual interpretation. This may be explained as follows. In a certain sense
the desire for a contract to be interpreted textually implies a lack of confidence
in the ability of a third party (court or arbitrator) – still unknown at the time
of conclusion of the contract – who will judge a possible dispute, to judge on
the basis of what the parties really envisaged when concluding the contract.20
This is not intended to disqualify any such third party, for that matter. The
lack of confidence in this third party may be seen as a derivative of a lack
of confidence in the other party. Will the latter, in case of a dispute about the
contract arising after its conclusion, not be tempted to give its own interpreta-
tion (‘twist’) to the contract, only because that is advantageous for it and will
its scope to do so not increase as contextual factors are more decisive for the
interpretation?Maybe it does not endwith the fear that such perceived oppor-
tunism of the other party will succeed with the court or the arbitrator. The
lack of confidence may also be related to the contracting party itself. There
are always different people from the organisations of the parties and from
their advisers involved in (highly) complex transactions, while the degree of
involvement and responsibility of each of themwill vary. In such transactions
there is a risk that a joint memory regarding the meaning of some of the
agreementsmade at the time is absent, or cannot be (re)constructed afterwards
with sufficient certainty.21 Thus, the preference for a textual interpretation
eventually rests on an effort to reduce uncertainty. For the parties – particularly
the other party – the margin must be reduced to plead (apparently) with the
force of arguments certain views not supported by the text of the contract.
For the court or the arbitrator the margin must be reduced to take a certain
decision not supported by the text of the contract. Parties who think along
19 Compare for instance Dutch Supreme Court 19 January 2007, LJN AZ3178, NJ 2007, 575
(Meyer Europe/PontMeyer) LJN BL9546, and Dutch Supreme Court 4 June 2010, LJN BL9546,
NJ 2010/312 (Euroland/Gilde Buy-Out Fund).
20 Compare R.H.J. van Bijnen, Aanvullend contractenrecht (doctoral thesis Tilburg), Den Haag:
Bju 2005, p. 200.
21 A similar thing applies when standard contracts or boilerplate provisions are usedwithout
the parties devoting sufficient attention to their contents. Compare C.E. Drion, ‘Anglo-
Amerikaanse contracten, een zegen of een ramp?’,NJB 2011/24, p. 1523. The problemmay
be obviated partly by working with a customary or standard meaning of such provisions.
However, it is not the starting point of Dutch law that certain formulations have a standard
or customarymeaning. The familiar example refers to terms such as ‘vouch for’ or ‘guaran-
tee’; see Dutch Supreme Court 22 December 1995, LJN ZC1930, NJ 1996/300 (Hoog Catha-
rijne); Dutch Supreme Court 4 February 2000, LJNAA4728,NJ 2000/562 with commentary
from JBMV (Mol/Meijer Beheer II). When such ameaning is actually established, the Haviltex
criterion subsequently takes it into account. See Dutch Supreme Court 4 May 2007, LJN
BA1564, NJ 2007/187.
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these lines, choose to rely on the text of their agreements, knowing that this
entails risks as well.
In view of the principle of party autonomy the court has reason to respect
that choice. As argued, however, it is difficult to formulate a general sub-rule
by way of a distinction of the general Haviltex criterion. Indeed, under Dutch
law the circumstances under which the arguments in favour of a textual
interpretation apply are circumstances that will not always be valid. Therefore
it is for the court to decide whether the case is one in which the conditions
for a textual interpretation are present. An expedient may be for the parties
in their contract to make a distinct choice for a textual interpretation. This is
not necessary for the court to arrive at a decision that in the circumstances
of the case the interpretation should accord a lot of weight to textual argu-
ments; this decision is made even now, without such a clause. It is possible
for the court to derive from a contractual choice for textual interpretation that
the parties insist on this form of interpretation, provided that choice wasmade
deliberately. If it then concerns a case that qualifies for this, the court can rest
assured that thismanner of interpretation, with all the pros and cons it entails,
is the desirable form of interpretation for the parties concerned. That provides
the basis for taking things a step further and stating that under these circum-
stances the parties’ choice for textual interpretation must be respected. Once
that is assumed, the parties can be certain beforehand that their contract will
be interpreted textually.
3 CERTAINTY OF AND ADDITION TO THE CONTRACT
This will not suffice, because the legal consequences of contracts are not
determined only by (interpretation of) the agreements made, but also by the
other sources of law referred to in article 6:248 DCC (Dutch Civil Code): law,
usage and reasonableness and fairness. The effect of reasonableness and
fairness warrants particular attention in this context,22 for its impact on the
contract is the most difficult to gauge beforehand. It is known that interpreta-
tion and addition are legally related instruments. According to the (prevailing)
view, which is also expressed in the case law of the Dutch Supreme Court,23
these are two separate tenets. Indeed, only after it has been established by
means of interpretation what rights and duties arise directly from the con-
22 Compare C.E. Drion, ‘Uitleg van uitleg’,NJB 2010, p. 279 and ‘De status van de redelijkheid
en billijkheid, NJB 2007, p. 433, which speaks of the ‘knotty tenet’ of interpretation and
the ‘panacea’ of reasonableness and fairness.
23 See for example Dutch Supreme Court 19 October 2007, LJN BA7024, NJ 2007/565, JOR
2008/23 with commentary from Tjittes (Vodafone/ETC), legal grounds 3.4-3.5 (cf. about this
judgment also the discussion between Grosheide and Drion in Contracteren 2008, pp. 30-32);
Dutch Supreme Court 19 November 2010, LJN BN7886, NJ 2010/623 (Skare/Flexmen); Parl.
Gesch. Boek 6, pp. 67 and 69; Asser/Hartkamp&Sieburgh 6-III* 2010, nr. 366.
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tractual agreements, can it be ascertained which obligations and other legal
consequences are additionally attached to these agreements by the law, usage
and reasonableness and fairness. It is at once acknowledged that in practice
the interpretation of the contract as awhole and the role of the additional effect
of reasonableness and fairness are occasionally difficult to separate, seeing
that reasonableness and fairness also play a role in the interpretation. As a
result, one cannot always indicate clearly where ‘interpretation’ stops and
‘addition’ begins. For that matter, the prevailing doctrine in the Netherlands
is in line with that of other (European) systems, which also make the distinc-
tion between interpretation and addition, along with their own nuances.24
Whereas the blurred boundary line between interpretation and additional
effect of reasonableness and fairness is not problematic in general, it may give
rise to problems in contracts referred to here whereby the parties’ wish is that
the text should be central in their interpretation. That is precisely where the
follow-up question may crop up: is it not likely that a contract interpreted
so strictly should have shortfalls rather than a contract that allows for a broad
and reasonable interpretation based on the circumstances of the case? And
if so, does this not imply that this leaves more room for the additional effect
of the principle of reasonableness and fairness? Or, conversely, should the
strict approach governing the interpretation of such a contract be carried
through also to the additional effect of reasonableness and fairness? The latter
approach is preferable when it may be assumed that the parties have deliber-
ately decided on a strict interpretation in a case qualifying therefor. This
approach seems feasible.
The impact of the additional effect of reasonableness and fairness may
fluctuate, depending on the nature of the contract. This may mean that there
is little room left for the additional effect of reasonableness and fairness,
because it concerns a contract that must be interpreted strictly. In case law
this is expressed, for example, in the idea that a strict application of the condi-
tions of an independent bank guarantee cannot be circumvented by attaining
a result deviating from that strict application on the basis of the additional
effect of reasonableness and fairness.25 Following on this, it may also be
argued that a strict application of the additional effect of reasonableness and
fairness ties in with the nature of the contract in the sense that the result of
the strict interpretation of the contract cannot be prejudiced by means of the
24 See M.W. Hesselink, De redelijkheid en billijkheid in het Europees privaatrecht (doctoral thesis
Utrecht) 1999, p. 138; N. Kornet, Contract Interpretation and Gap Filling: Comparative and
Theoretical Perspectives (doctoral thesis Maastricht), 2006, p. 4, 266.
25 Dutch Supreme Court 26March 2004,NJ 2004/309 (Anthea Yachting Company/ABN-AMRO).
This does not exclude, by the way, that the bank may be obliged to point out to a party
that the party’s reliance on the guarantee does not satisfy the requirements. See Dutch
Supreme Court 9 June 1995, LJN ZC1749, NJ 1995/639 (Gesnoteg/Mees Pierson) with com-
mentary from PvS, in which the Dutch Supreme Court recognises the principle of strict
conformity in accordance with the conclusion of advocate general Strikwerda.
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addition.26 This is not to say that no scope would be left for the additional
effect of reasonableness and fairness. Here too, though, restraint will need to
be exercised. The wish to do so could also be expressed by the parties in their
contract, for instance by indicating that they think that the contract should
only be added to on the ground of reasonableness and fairness when this is
necessary to make the contract work in accordance with the parties’ inten-
tions.27 In this context reference can bemade to the provision of article II-9:101
paragraph 4 DCFR. It says that no ‘implied term’ can be assumed by the court
‘if the parties have deliberately left a matter unprovided for, accepting the
consequences of so doing’. The comment clarifies that this provision is intended
for the event ‘where the parties have foreseen a contingency and have deliber-
ately left it unprovided for, accepting the risks and consequences of so doing.’
The provision is not intended for the event ‘where the parties foresee a
situation but either think it will not materialise or “forget” to regulate it
without intending to accept the risks.’28 A similar provision has been included
in article 66 par. 3 of the Feasibility Study, though formulated slightly different-
ly: ‘if the parties have deliberately left a matter unprovided for, accepting that
one or other party would bear the risk.’ Article 68 par. 3 of the proposal for
a Common European Sales Law also uses this formulation.29 This formulation
expresses even better that there is a distribution of risks. One could say that
with regard to these deliberately ‘unregulated’ situations there is no ‘gap’ in
the agreements, as it has been agreed that the party confronted with this
situation must bear the consequences thereof itself.30 It concerns situations
of which the parties know that they could occur and which they knowingly
leave ‘unregulated’ in the sense referred to just now.
4 CERTAINTY AND UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES
According to art. 6:258 DCC a contract may be modified or set aside ‘on the
basis of unforeseen circumstances of such a nature that the other party, accord-
ing to standards of reasonableness and fairness, may not expect the contract
to be maintained in unmodified form’. The provision concerns the occurrence
26 See also a case such as Dutch Supreme Court 16May 2008, LJN BC2793,NJ 2008/284 (Chubb/
Dagenstead). It is difficult to conceive that the additional effect of reasonableness and fairness
could lead to yet another result than the objective interpretation of the description of cover.
27 Compare Tjittes, Uitleg van schriftelijke contracten, Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri 2009, p. 88,
about the correction by means of addition of a meaningless interpretation result.
28 C. Von Bar and E. Clive (eds.), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private
Law, DCFR, Full Edition, München: Sellier 2009, p. 580.
29 On the understanding that one speaks of ‘a matter unregulated’ instead of ‘a matter
unprovided for’.
30 That is why in Dutch Supreme Court 19-11-2010, LJN BN7886,NJ 2010, 623 (Skare/Flexmen)
it could be judged that the contractual provision about the allocation of taxes was not of
such a far-reaching tenor as appeared to be the case at first sight.
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of circumstances after the conclusion of a contract which are unforeseen, i.e.
which have not been taken into account in the contract because the parties
have not made any (tacit) arrangement about them. In addition, it must be
a change of circumstances that is not for the risk of the party which suffers
a loss as a result. According to settled case law the provision should be applied
restrictively, since reasonableness and fairness require allegiance to the given
word first and foremost.31
In the application of a provision such as article 6:258 DCC uncertainties
are bound to present themselves, for the very reason that it concerns such
special cases.32 This may be clarified by some examples. Fluctuations in the
market and hence of prices are a general fact. In principle, then, these cannot
lead to the application of article 6:258 DCC. The same goes for price changes
caused by amendments to legislation and regulations. In extreme cases the
application of article 6:258 DCC is not excluded. A clear criterion is lacking,
however. Sometimes a change in value of 50% or more is mentioned.33 This
is not meant to indicate that at such a percentage the contract should be
modified; at most it gives an indication that article 6:258 DCC could apply
(leaving aside whether, upon an affirmative answer, a price correction by the
same percentage should take place). A very sharp fall in prices (by 170%) of
waste paper has been deemed sufficient in case law, though.34 One should
consider that a contract of a (partly) speculative nature is incompatible with
modification for that very reason, as it has allowed for the risk of price
changes. In that sense the court ruled on a disappointing development in the
price of building land when an appeal was made to a building company to
fulfil its repurchase obligation after having transferred land to the municipality
within the framework of the development of a zoning plan.35
The parties may have an interest in agreeing on a contractual arrangement
about unforeseen circumstances. In this respect it should be noted that article
6:258 DCC is mandatory and cannot be contractually excluded.36 The parties
can try to put the flesh on the bones of this provision. They canmake arrange-
ments fromwhich it follows that allowance has beenmade for certain changes
in the contract. It may be agreed that certain changes are at the risk of one
of the parties. Such a clause may also indicate how such changes should be
31 Dutch Supreme Court 20 February 1998, LJNZC2587,NJ 1998/493 (Briljant Schreuders/ABP);
Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-III* 2010, nr. 444.
32 For an extensive survey of possible applications see P. Abas, Rebus sic stantibus, Deventer:
Kluwer 1989, pp. 215-216. See also R.Momberg Uribe, The Effect of a Change of Circumstances
on the Binding Force of Contracts-Comparative Perspectives (doctoral thesis Utrecht), Antwerp:
Intersentia 2011.
33 In the comment on art. 6.2.2 Unidroit Principles for International Commercial Contracts.
See also Abas, WPNR 6307.
34 District Court of Roermond (summary proceedings) 1 July 1993, KG 1993, 317.
35 Court of Appeal of ’s-Hertogenbosch 17 November 1983, BR 1984, p. 152.
36 Article 6:250 DCC.
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dealt with. Thus, a price clausemay indicate that the price is indexed according
to a certain formula. Clauses like this clarify that the said change of circum-
stances cannot be considered to be ‘unforeseen’ in the sense of art. 6:258 DCC.
However: no absolute certainty can be obtained thereby. The extent of the
clause will need to be determined through interpretation (such as: does a price
indexation also regard excessive price increases or only those that are normally
foreseeable?). Here a contractual arrangement about the interpretation, such
as discussed in section 2, may be useful.
5 CONCLUSION
All things considered, what role is left for reasonableness and fairness?
Although that role is not played out, practically speaking it has been driven
away towards the edges of the playing field. Rendered briefly, the following
applies. In the approach described above, too, the starting point is maintained
as described in the judgment Pensioenfonds DSM-Chemie/Fox, that for the
interpretation of a written contract decisive importance will always be
attributed to all circumstances of the concrete case, assessed according to
standards of reasonableness and fairness. In the administration of justice this
principle is made operational in an interpretation criterion which under certain
circumstancesmay be objective (Haviltex criterion) or is objective by definition
(the CAOor collective bargaining agreement criterion). It has been argued that
an application of the Haviltex criterionmay result in an objective interpretation
whereby textual factors are dominant, that the parties may have good reasons
for deciding on these in their contract and that the court can and must respect
that choice in the cases referred to. Further, it has been argued that the addi-
tional effect of reasonableness and fairness should reflect this strict manner
of interpretation of the contract. This means that the additional effect must
not detract from the result of the interpretationwhen it concerns subjects which
the parties have deliberately not provided for. The above implies that the
parties can to a great extent exert influence on what reasonableness and
fairness entail in the interpretation of and addition to their contract.37 That
also applies to parties’ agreements about the application of article 6:258 DCC.
Focusing attention on the text when determining the contents of the contract
is, in these cases, not at odds with what reasonableness and fairness imply
37 This is not the same as the question whether the parties could contractually declare the
additional effect of reasonableness and fairness to be inapplicable. See for that view R.H.J.
van Bijnen, Aanvullend contractenrecht (doctoral thesis Tilburg), Den Haag: Bju 2005, p. 284;
C.E. Drion, NJB 2007, p. 433; H.N. Schelhaas, NTBR 2008, p. 153. Against that H.C.F.
Schoordijk, ‘Het betwiste onderscheid tussen uitleg en derogeren te goeder trouw breekt
op’, NJB 2007, p. 1233; Asser/Hartkamp&Sieburgh 6-III* 2010, nr. 380; P.S. Bakker, ‘Uitleg
van commerciële contracten (I),WPNR 6890 (2011), pp. 481-482 and (II, end)’,WPNR (2011)
6891, pp. 505-508.
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in the relationship between these parties. However, in extreme cases, reason-
ableness and fairness will intervene. That follows from the presence of correct-
ive mechanisms, such as articles 3:13, 6:248 par. 2 and 6:258 DCC. Thus, certain
undesirable forms of party behaviour can be corrected (such as acting in bad
faith and conduct resulting in forfeiture of rights), and in exceptional cases
of circumstances really not foreseen by the parties the contract may be
modified.

